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squarely with the collective aspect of the right, there is very little case law and commentary 
on which to structure this debate.  


















little support in the current jurisprudence, and its breadth is probably unworkable.  By way 


















and restrained, however, the objective model rejects any notion of a personal or subjective 
understanding of what constitutes association and in this sense it too restrictive.  A possible 
blend of the two models, and the embrace of a qualified principle of content neutrality, may 
best deal with the concerns raised by each. 


















defined scope of protected association.  The law as it currently stands is too modest in its 
protection of individual associational activity.  Hopefully, a balance can be struck between 
the unworkable breadth of the subjective model and the harsh and stubborn restrictiveness of 
the current law.  A qualified form of content neutrality may provide the right balance.
INTRODUCTION
Freedom of association has long been considered an inalienable and necessary pre-
condition for a fully functioning liberal democracy.1  Due to the cooperative nature 
of associational activity, associations play an important role in cultivating a coop-
erative disposition in society.2  Historically, the association has been a main vehi-
cle through which persecuted groups have successfully resisted institutionalized 
hegemony.3  At the level of the individual, associational activity fosters personal 
self-fulfilment by facilitating the development of social qualities and behaviour.4  In 
Canada, associational life is especially important because our multicultural tradi-
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one’s qualities as a social being.”).
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tion has tended to encourage affiliations based on nationality and ethnicity.5  The 
right to associate, which is expressly protected under s. 2(d) of the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms,6 ultimately recognizes the fundamentally “social nature of 
human endeavours.”7  
The jurisprudential development of s. 2(d) has been largely dominated by the phe-
nomenon of collective activity.  The seminal Supreme Court of Canada decisions 
under the provision have arisen in the labour relations context and have grappled 
with the question of the extent to which it protects the collective actions of labour 
unions.8  It is undeniable that protecting the collective pursuit of individual goals 
from unjustified governmental interference is a paramount aspect of freedom of 
association.  However, beyond activities undertaken in association, individuals 
pursue an extremely broad range of other activities which, in the vernacular sense, 
must be understood as associational.  Unfortunately, the extent to which s. 2(d) pro-
tects individual activity outside the collective context has been largely unexplored 
by courts in Canada since the proclamation of the Charter in 1982.  To the extent that 
the law has explored this issue, there is little protection afforded to individual asso-
ciational activity; instead, the concept of “associational activity” has been narrowly 
and formalistically constructed. 
The purpose of this note is to explore, in a preliminary fashion, the protection of 
individual activity under s. 2(d) of the Charter.  I contrast the jurisprudence with 
two model frameworks for the protection of association.  I briefly outline the doc-
trinal contours of s. 2(d) in Part I.  In Part II, I introduce the model frameworks – the 
objective and subjective approaches to association.  The purpose of Part III is to 
explore these frameworks through an analysis of several cases.  Through applying 
the model frameworks, I hope to shed light on the current limits and capacities of 
the jurisprudence.  In Part IV, I analyze the wider implications for the current juris-
prudence and the model frameworks though an assessment of the constitutionality 
of one of Canada’s new antiterrorism offences.  The Anti-Terrorism Act,9 to the extent 
that it criminalizes individual activity undertaken for associational purposes, offers 
a helpful and topical lens through which to explore these issues.  In the end, I hope 
to provide preliminary treatment of the phenomenon of individual associational 
activity under the Charter while, at the same time, proposing changes to the current 
analytical framework which embrace the principle of content neutrality.    
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Schneiderman,
    supra note 2 at 174.
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at 230-231.
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As it currently stands, there are five propositions of law which together encapsu-
late affirmative10 s. 2(d) protection.11  First, s. 2(d) protects the freedom to “estab-
lish, belong to and maintain an association.”12  For the purposes of this note, this 
first proposition is the most important, as it is the only one directly contemplating 
individual action.  The second proposition functions as a constraint rather than a 
basis of protection: “s. 2(d) does not protect an activity solely on the ground that 
the activity is a foundational or essential purpose of an association.”13  Thus, once 
formed, the essential activities of an association are not accorded constitutional 
protection.14  I believe this proposition also precludes constitutional protection for 
individual activities taken in furtherance of the interests of an already-established 
association, or taken in order to advance a collective interest.15  Under the third and 
fourth propositions, respectively, s. 2(d) protects the exercise in association of the 
constitutional rights of individuals and the exercise in association of the legal rights 
of individuals.16  The ultimate rationale for these latter propositions is to protect the 
individual right to establish associations, since, to restrict the collective exercise of 
an activity legally pursuable by an individual “is essentially [to] attack … the ability 
of individuals to establish an association for that purpose.”17 
Finally, the fifth doctrinal proposition under s. 2(d) flows from Dunmore.  Although 
the precise contours of this proposition remain unclear,18 its motivation stems from 














[T]here will be occasions where a given activity does not fall within the third 
and fourth rules [under s. 2(d)]….These occasions will involve activities 
which (1) are not protected under any other constitutional freedom, and (2) 
cannot, for one reason or another, be understood as the lawful activities of in-
dividuals… [S]uch activities may be collective in nature, in that they cannot 
be performed by individuals acting alone. The prohibition of such activities 







































from the positive aspect of s. 2(d), and was only violated where state-compelled association imposed ideologi-
cal conformity on the individual claimant.  See also Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, [1991] 2 
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Dunmore, supra note 8, although novel in the sense of confronting under-inclusive 
legislation, was so modest that much of these dicta were probably obiter as unnecessary to the disposition.  See 
infra note 68.
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Dunmore, supra note 8 at para. 16.
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According to Dunmore, there is but one legal inquiry under s. 2(d):20  “has the state 
precluded activity because of its associational nature, thereby discouraging the col-
lective pursuit of common goals?”  A logical interpretation of this inquiry suggests 
that the underlying concern is for malicious governmental objectives.21  In sum, it 
seems apparent from the discussion in Dunmore that the Court was chiefly con-
cerned with expanding the extent to which s. 2(d) protects collective activities.22  







which stands for the proposition that associational activity constituting violence 
will not be accorded protection under s. 2(d).24  In my opinion, Suresh merely ex-
tends to s. 2(d) the narrow threshold limitation set out in the freedom of expression 
context in Irwin Toy v. Quebec.25  In Irwin Toy, the Supreme Court was clear that the 
analysis under s. 2(b) was content neutral;26 however, as a threshold matter, expres-
sive activity taking the form of violence was not to be accorded protection.27  By 
importing the Irwin Toy limitation into the s. 2(d) framework, Suresh establishes that 
associational conduct which takes the form of violence, i.e., associational activity 
that is, itself, violent, will not fall within the scope of s. 2(d).  The implications of this 












In Canadian Charter jurisprudence, analytical frameworks tend to develop with an 
eye to a subsequent s. 1 balancing.  For example, under freedom of expression en-
shrined in s. 2(b), the Supreme Court of Canada has tended to define expression 
very broadly, largely by reference to whether the activity conveys or attempts to 
convey meaning.28  The only exception, set out in Irwin Toy,29 is for expressive activ-
ity taking the form of violence.  In R. v. Keegstra,30 in holding that threats of violence 
constituted protected expression, the Court briefly discussed the relationship be-
tween content and form:  
While the line between form and content is not always easily drawn … threats 










ence to the content of their meaning.  As such, they do not fall within the ex-
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does suggest a concern for improper legislative purposes. 
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R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45 at para. 27, where content neutrality was implicitly invoked as the 
rationale for according protection under s. 2(b) to the act of possessing child pornography.
27 
    Irwin Toy, supra note 25 at 970; Hogg, supra note 14 at 40.5(c) & 40.5(d).
28 
    Irwin Toy, supra note 25 at 968. 
29 
    Irwin Toy, supra note 25. at 973.
30 
    R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 [Keegstra]. 
31 
    Ibid. at 733 [emphasis added].
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Indeed, in Keegstra, the Court refused to analogize hate propaganda to actual vio-
lence such as to engage the Irwin Toy exception,32 despite the fact that hate propa-
ganda may have the effect of furthering or promoting violence.  In sum, it is only in 
“those rare cases where expression is communicated in a physically violent man-
ner”33 that an activity which conveys or attempts to convey meaning will be exclud-
ed from s. 2(b) protection.  Consequently, most s. 2(b) cases reaching the Supreme 
Court of Canada turn on the s. 1 analysis.34  
Similarly, under s. 2(a) of the Charter, religion is also given a broad interpretation, 
the confines of which are essentially dictated by the claimant’s subjective beliefs 
and conceptions.35  The claimant need only demonstrate, at the threshold, that “he 
or she sincerely believes that a certain belief or practice is required by his or her 









    Toronto,37 “[t]his Court has consistently 
refrained from formulating internal limits to the scope of freedom of religion ... 
[Instead, it has] opted to balance the competing rights under   s. 1…”38  Non-trivial 
State interference with an honestly held religious belief or practice will generally39 
engage s. 2(a) and require justification under s. 1.40   
By way of contrast, the equality analysis under s. 15(1) of the Charter contains im-
portant objective elements which cause much of the limiting work to take place 
outside of the s. 1 context.41 Section 15(1) is only engaged where a law, beyond 
being formally discriminatory, demeans the dignity of a “reasonable person, in cir-
cumstances similar to those of the claimant.”42 As a purely subjective framework 
would not employ the standard of the “reasonable person,” the “human dignity” 
analysis contains an objective assessment.43  In analyzing human dignity in a given 
case, moreover, an important if not decisive44 factor is whether the ground of dis-
crimination corresponds to the “need, capacity, or circumstances of the claimant or 
others.”45  In order to satisfy this threshold, the government may, in certain circum-
32 
    Keegstra, supra note 30 at 732.
33 
    Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825 at para. 60 [Ross].
34 
    Hogg,
    supra note 14 at 40.2; Robert Sharpe et. al., The Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 2nd ed. (Toronto:  
Irwin Law, 2001) at 125, 128 & 130.
35 
    Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551 at paras. 40-44 [Amselem]; Ross, supra note 33 at para. 71 
[Ross].
36 
    Multani v. Commission Scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2006] S.C.J. No. 6 (QL) at para. 35 [Multani]; Amselem, 



























right at issue in a given case.  In the recent case of Multani, supra note 36 at paras. 24-31, the Supreme Court of 
Canada carefully examined the s. 2(a) framework and determined that this narrow exception will only apply 



















under s. 1. 
40 
    Amselem, supra note 35 at para. 65; Multani, supra note 36 at para. 34.
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Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 at para. 88; Egan v. Canada, [1995] 
2 S.C.R. 513 at para. 56.
42 
    Law, ibid. at para. 88.
43 
    Hogg,





















    supra note 15 at 52.7(b), suggests that “the ‘correspondence’ factor is usually the decisive one.”
45 
    Law, supra note 41 at para. 88.
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stances, rely on statistical generalizations,46 which tend to objectify the analysis.  For 
example, in Gosselin v. Quebec,47 a majority of the Supreme Court employed statisti-
cal, objective evidence regarding unemployment patterns in Quebec to establish 
that the purpose of the impugned statutory scheme corresponded with the actual 
circumstances of the claimant and her group.  Therefore, the substantive basis for 
equality rights are at least partially defined by reference to objective indicia.  The 
self limiting nature of s. 15(1) analyses impacts on the role of s. 1. 
Therefore, the analytical frameworks established under ss. 2(a) and 2(b) are funda-
mentally different from that set out under s. 15(1).  This difference has a strong ef-
fect on the analytical relationship between these provisions and s. 1.  With these two 
contrasting frameworks in mind, the purpose of this Part is to offer two alternative 
models through which to approach individual activity under s. 2(d).    
The subjective model adopts the approach taken to other fundamental freedoms 
under the Charter.  Under this approach, “association” is a purely personal concept 
and, as such, is given an extremely broad definition dependent on the subjective 
conceptions of claimants.  Thus, when delineating the scope of the “freedom to es-
tablish, belong to, and maintain an association,” the model focuses on whether the 
activity in question is associationally-motivated; if so, it finds prima facie protection 
under s. 2(d) and the limiting work takes place under s. 1.  An activity is associa-
tionally-motivated, for example, where through it someone seeks to foster together-
ness.  Individual actions taken to foster initial togetherness between two or more 
people falls within the scope of the freedom to establish an association; or, to main-
tain continuing togetherness, the freedom to maintain an association.  An activity 
is also associationally-motivated where it is undertaken to further the interests of a 
community of which the claimant is a member.  This is because, in pursuing such 
activities, an individual is nurturing his or her connection to the group.  
One version of the subjective model can be reconciled with the narrow exception 
for violence set out in Irwin Toy.48  Conduct which takes the form of violence will not 
be protected, despite its associational motivation.  However, associational conduct 
which falls short of actually constituting violence, but which is otherwise socially 
harmful or offensive, will nevertheless be accorded prima facie protection under s. 
2(d).49  This will be discussed in more detail in Part IV.       
By way of contrast, the objective model adopts a particular definition of association 
which is necessarily self-limiting.  Activity is associational when it carries certain 
objective indicia, adopted from a particular understanding of the core purpose of 
s. 2(d).  The core purpose of freedom of association is consistently defined in the 
jurisprudence as protecting the coming together of persons for the common pursuit 
of individual activities and goals.50 An activity is protected under the freedom to 
establish an association insofar as it is an objectively necessary precondition for 
the coalescing of persons.  Although the freedom to maintain an association is also 
46 











    Irwin Toy, supra note 25 at 970.
49 
    Keegstra, supra note 30 at 733; Ross, supra note 33 at para. 60.
50 
    Alberta Reference, supra note 1 at 395; Dunmore, supra note 8 at para. 15; Professional Institute, supra note 8 at 
401-402.
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protected, by “maintain,” the model contemplates only those activities which are 
objectively necessary to retain the cohesiveness of the group.  Thus, the essential 
activities of the association are not protected.  Although such substantive activities 
constitute the purpose of or reason for a particular association, they are considered 
extraneous to the coalescing of persons and the maintenance of unity.  Another 
important feature of the objective model, also flowing from its focus on the core 
purpose of s. 2(d), is its resistance to the protection of peculiar manifestations of as-
















not enough that an enactment merely precludes a particular instance or form of as-
sociation if the people targeted can nevertheless come together despite the interfer-







In R. v. Skinner,51 a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada held that the Criminal 
Code prohibition on communicating for the purpose of prostitution did not violate 
s. 2(d), despite the fact that such activity “contemplates as [its] final objective the 
‘association’ of…individuals.”52  According to Dickson C.J., writing for the majority, 
since the “target of the…provision [is] expressive conduct,” i.e., public communica-
tions which precede prostitution, the provision “does not attack conduct of an as-
sociational nature.”53  Dickson C.J. was concerned about the analytical relationship 
between ss. 2(b) and 2(d) of the Charter, and the unworkable breadth of protected 
associational activity this relationship could engender.  Although acknowledging 
that “[m]ost limitations on expression have the effect of limiting the possibilities for 
human association,” Dickson C.J. was adamant that the mere limiting of the possi-
bility of a particular form of association, such as commercial activity or agreements, 
“is not…sufficient to show a prima facie interference with the s. 2(d).”54
One proposition which emerges out of Skinner is that, where the state does not 
interfere with an association directly, but only targets conduct which precedes its 
formation, it does not offend s. 2(d).  In Canadian Egg Marketing Association v. Rich-
ardson,55 a majority of the Supreme Court cited Skinner approvingly for the proposi-
tion that where an activity “contemplates an association of the parties,” the state 
may nevertheless target such activity provided that “the association per se,” is left 
alone.  This proposition runs counter to the general, purposive approach to Charter 
interpretation,56 and seems to countenance state interference with the objectively 
necessary preconditions of a particular form of association.  This proposition clear-
ly runs afoul of the subjective model of association.  The claimant in Skinner was 
undisputedly communicating for the purpose of establishing an association, albeit 
of a temporary and particular nature.  








    Ibid. at 1243.
53 
    Ibid. at 1244.
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Ibid. at 1245.
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Charter rights are to be given a liberal and purposive inter-
pretation.  See generally Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 at 156.
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el.  At first glance, the objective model does protect objectively necessary precondi-
tions to the establishment of associations.  As discussed earlier, however, the objec-
tive model does not protect peculiar manifestations of association.  Implicit in the 
reasoning in Skinner is the importance placed on the fact that the accused could still 
associate with whomever he wished.  The statutory provision only interfered with 
a peculiar manifestation of association – commercial prostitution.  Thus, the core 
purpose of s. 2(d) was preserved as the accused could still technically join together 
with other persons.      










    Council),57 a decision of the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench.  At 
issue in this case was a municipal bylaw which withheld licences from all life insur-
ance agents maintaining an office on the same premises as a “bank, trust company, 
loan company, finance company or credit union.”58  The purpose of the bylaw was 
to protect the integrity and autonomy of the life insurance industry.  However, its 
target was clearly, in the vernacular sense, a particular form of association – com-
mercial cohabitation.  The Court, citing Skinner, rejected the s. 2(d) claim:  “[t]he 
bylaw does not prohibit [the claimant] from associating with her life insurance 
customers, [the bank] or bank personnel either on or off bank premises.  It only 
prohibits her from maintaining an office on bank premises.”59  Thus, it was impor-
tant to the Court that the claimant could still technically associate, that is, come to-
gether with, the same people with whom she sought to associate prior to the bylaw: 





    Perreault,60 which involved a regulatory prohibition on performing con-
struction work without employees, the Quebec Court held that hiring and working 
with employees was not associational activity in the requisite sense.  The employer-
employee relationship was but one peculiar manifestation of association, thus lack-
ing the constitutional significance requested by the claimant.    
Overall, the tide of jurisprudence supports a minimalist notion of association.  As 
Skinner, Life Insurance Council and Perreault illustrate, the courts have not taken seri-
ously claims to constitutionalize peculiar manifestations of association.61  Instead, 
they have focused on the minimal right to come together and maintain together-
ness by upholding statutory provisions, despite their interference with association, 
provided they leave room for alternative methods of coalescing.  In this way, the 
jurisprudence accords with the objective model.  By way of contrast, the subjective 
model has not been embraced by the jurisprudence, despite the fact that it accords 
with the approach generally taken to the other fundamental Charter freedoms.  No 
where in the cases cited is any consideration given to the possibility that the activi-
ties in question were undertaken with an associational object or mindset.  Indeed, 











    Council), [1998] 10 W.W.R. 748 (Sask. Q.B.), 
rev’d on administrative law grounds, [2001] 4 W.W.R. 189 (Sask. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (2001), 
217 Sask. R. 258 [Life Insurance Council].
58 
    Ibid. at para. 4.
59 






    Perreault (1992), [1992] R.J.Q. 795 (C.Q.) [Perreault].  Although Perreault arose 




















“Intimacy, Rights and the Parent-Child Relationship: Rethinking Freedom of Association in Canada” (2004) 16 
N.J.C.L. 103-152. 
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tion’s are protected,62 it is arguable that individual activity undertaken to further 
an association’s interests would also be denied protection.  The courts have chosen 











Anti-terrorism policy offers a helpful and topical lens through which to analyze 
wider implications engaged by the model frameworks.  The Anti-Terrorism Act63 
created several new offences through amendments to the Criminal Code,64 including 
an offence of providing property to a terrorist group under s. 83.03(b).  The defini-
tion of “terrorist group” is partially dependent on a list of entities promulgated by 
the Governor-in-Council.65  Many organizations on the list engage in multifaceted 
activities, including the provision of social services.  In some cases, leading social 
and cultural organizations operating in certain countries are included on the list 
because the Governor-in-Council has reasonable grounds to believe that they en-
gage in terrorist activity.66  Any provision of property, either directly or indirectly, 
to a terrorist group is prohibited, even if the accused’s intention was to further the 
non-violent activities of the group.  
Recall that one postulate of the subjective model is that all activity subjectively mo-
tivated by a desire to further the interests of one’s association is worthy of prima facie 
protection.  It is very easy to imagine situations where a particular instance of pro-
viding property to a charitable organization is subjectively motivated by a desire 
to further the interests of the association with which one identifies.  Also recall that 
the subjective model seeks to protect those activities undertaken for the purpose 
of establishing or nurturing one’s connection with the group.  These activities are 
conceptually narrower than activities undertaken to further the collective interests 
of an association.  It is possible that s. 83.03(b) may capture instances where some-
one provides money to a charity abroad in order to fulfil a desire to connect or 
reconnect with an ethnic or religious constituency with which he or she identifies, 
rather than with an eye to supporting the substantive activities of the group.  From 
a policy perspective, does this interference with an honest attempt to connect with 
one’s constituency abroad make sense, despite a s. 1 justification? 
In my opinion, since the first proposition of the subjective model tends to extend 
prima facie constitutional protection to most of the activities of associations, it is 
probably unworkable.  Since associations “act” through the agency of their mem-
bers, the activities of associations would be cloaked in constitutional protection if 
characterized as the associationally-motivated actions of its individual constituents. 
In the Alberta Reference, a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the 
notion that s. 2(d) “accord[s] an independent constitutional status to the aims, pur-
poses, and activities of the association,” thereby conferring “greater constitutional 
62 
    Professional Institute, supra note 8 at 402. 
63 
    Supra note 9.
64 
    Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 83.03(b).
65 
    Criminal Code, s. 83.01 “terrorist group,” s. 83.05; Regulations Establishing a List of Entities,
    S.O.R./2002-­‐‑284.
66 
    E.g., in Lebanon, two main organizations providing cultural and social services, Hezbollah and Amal, are 
listed.
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rights upon members of the association than upon non-members.”67  Although the 
subjective model is technically concerned with individual conduct, it can have the 
effect of converting s. 2(d) into a collective right, thus accomplishing indirectly what 
has been consistently and out-rightly rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada, at 
least pre-Dunmore.68  For example, although there is no constitutional right to gun 
ownership, gun prohibitions may, in effect, prima facie infringe freedom of associa-
tion insofar as gun ownership is a subjectively necessary incident of establishing or 
maintaining a gun club or terrorist group.69  In fact, most legal prohibitions would 
violate s. 2(d) under the subjective approach insofar as persons associate for the 
purpose of participating in the subject-matter of the prohibition.  Unless the subjec-
tive model adopted the violence exception imported from Irwin Toy70 and Suresh,71 
an individual member of a terrorist group could invoke s. 2(d) to impugn the con-
stitutionality or constitutional applicability of a murder, or terrorism-facilitation, 
charge on the grounds that the crime in question was committed in the interests 
of his or her larger association or motivated by a concern to maintain his or her 
membership therein.  Although the s. 1 analysis would almost certainly maintain 
the functional status quo, this approach to s. 2(d) leaves the complete substantive 
definition of association to the possibly unreasonable, and likely self-motivated, 
whims of individual persons.  
The second proposition of the subjective model – which seeks to protect those ac-
tivities undertaken for the purpose of establishing or nurturing one’s connection 
with the group – may also be unworkable, at least in its raw form.  The concept of a 
membership fee provides a good illustration.  In paying a membership fee, a person 
is providing property for the purposes of establishing his or her initial connection 
to the larger group.  In paying an annual fee, he or she maintains that connection. 
However, should the scope of constitutional protection turn on the arbitrary differ-
ences in governance and financing structures of various organizations?  Insofar as 
the money is allocated toward the undertaking of the substantive activities of the 
organization, the instrument of a membership fee could be used by groups to pro-
tect a principal source of funding.  In this way, constitutional protection for mem-
bership fees, which are undoubtedly subjectively motivated by a desire to establish 
or maintain one’s connection to an organization, could provide constitutional pro-
tection to the substantive activities of that group, contrary to the Alberta Reference 
and Professional Institute.72
One way to temper this effect is to introduce an element of objectivity into the anal-
ysis.  In this context, the analysis would not turn merely on whether the activity was 
honestly undertaken to establish or maintain one’s connection to the group.  Instead, 
67 
    Alberta Reference, supra note 1 at 404, McIntyre J. (although writing for himself, this aspect of McIntyre 
J.’s judgment had the substantial support of the short majority judgment of Le Dain J.); see also Professional 
Institute, supra note 8. 
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The scope of such protection, however, is unclear, as the remedy in Dunmore was so narrow as to render much 
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a factual determination must be made about whether the provision of property was 
a reasonably necessary condition precedent to the establishment or maintenance 
of the cohesiveness of the group.  Although there would be evidentiary difficulties 
here, it would not be enough that a particular instance of providing property was 
defined in terms of a membership fee.  It would need to be established that the or-
ganization requires a certain amount of money to maintain its very establishment, 
in the minimal sense of maintaining the coalescence of persons that is protected by 
the core purpose of s. 2(d).  
An extension of this idea is that Skinner was wrongly decided.  Governmental in-
terference with an objectively necessary precondition to the establishment of the 
prostitution-customer relationship – which was acknowledged to be a particular 
form of association – should arguably engage s. 2(d).  
On its face, s. 83.03(b) criminalizes all financial donations made to a terrorist or-
ganization.  In theory, this includes donations which are objectively necessary for 
the minimal establishment and maintenance of such groups.  The Irwin Toy73 and 
Suresh74 exceptions for violence do not apply in this context, as the making of such 
financial donations do not, in themselves, constitute violence and do not take the 
form of violence.75  Although, as a matter of policy, it is desirable to criminalize 
financial donations which help establish violent associations, the same was true 
for criminalizing violent threats76 and possession of child pornography,77 yet the s. 
2(b) analysis was content neutral, and such activity was accorded prima facie pro-
tection.  Moreover, although establishing and maintaining the cohesiveness of a 
violent association may have the effect of furthering violence, violent threats and 
hate propaganda carry the same potential, but were nonetheless accorded prima 
facie protection under s. 2(b).78 
Content neutrality in the context of association requires that the substantive aspira-
tions of the association are ignored in the s. 2(d) analysis, just like the substantive 
message is ignored in the s. 2(b) analysis.  Without content neutrality, we open the 
door to the censoring of particular kinds of groups outside the s. 1 balancing con-
text.  Once the door is open, changes in the political climate could expand the scope 
of groups accorded no protection.  Save for those cases where the associational con-
duct is itself violent, content neutrality ensures that policy concerns over particular 
kinds of association are dealt with in the s. 1 analysis.  The critical qualification, 
however, is that only associational activity objectively necessary to establish and 
maintain the cohesiveness of the association are accorded this protection; associa-
tional activity designed to further the substantive activities of the group are exclud-
ed under this modified version of the subjective model.79  Thus, in the s. 83.03(b) 
context, if a financial donation has the purpose or effect of facilitating the substan-
73 
    Irwin Toy, supra note 25 at 730.
74 
    See
    supra notes 24 - 28 and surrounding text. 
75 
    Ross, supra note 33 at para. 60.  The blurry line between form and content was acknowledged by the Court 
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tive activities of the association, it will be accorded no protection under s. 2(d). 
What about the other aspect of the objective model, i.e., resistance to protecting pe-
culiar manifestations of association?  In the present context, an individual charged 
under s. 83.03(b) is not precluded from associating with the group.  He or she is 
merely precluded from providing it property – a particular manifestation of as-
sociating.  Under Skinner and Life Insurance Council, since an accused remains able 
to come together with others, the prohibition should escape constitutional censure. 
However, there may very well be situations where, due to geographical or logis-
tic considerations, providing property is really the only reasonable mechanism 
through which one may associate with a group to which he or she belongs.  By 
precluding that activity, s. 83.03(b) may actually, in certain cases, be precluding ob-
jectively necessary preconditions for establishing and maintaining one’s connection 
with a group.  The underlying context would thus be important.  One should be 
cautious not to overstate this concern, however, as such a focus on the underlying 
context could raise difficulties.  For example, the more geographically or logisti-
cally tenuous a person’s connection to a group, the more constitutional protection 
would be accorded to his or her attempts to connect with that group, since it would 
take more drastic measures to reasonably maintain a meaningful connection.    
In my opinion, the objective model’s wholesale resistance to protecting peculiar 
manifestations of association is unduly restrictive.  There are countless forms of 
associational activity, each constituting a peculiar manifestation.  Since legislative 
interference will generally be directed at a specific associational act, the objective 
model would rarely be engaged.  Through the objective model, the government 
could often achieve its particular anti-associational policies by crafting prohibi-
tions which are easily characterized as preserving the core freedom to associate. 
Although some objective indicia may appropriately narrow the scope of s. 2(d) 
protection, this particular aspect of the objective model permits sweeping govern-
mental interference with associational activity which is objectively necessary to the 
establishment and maintenance of numerous forms of affiliation.   
 
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this note has been to discuss, in a preliminary fashion, the nature 
and scope of protection which is and ought to be afforded to individual activity 
under s. 2(d) of the Charter.  Since the s. 2(d) jurisprudence is dominated by labour 
relations cases, which tend to deal squarely with the collective aspect of the right, 
there is very little case law and commentary on which to structure the debate.  
By analogizing from the Charter’s other fundamental freedoms, however, it is pos-
sible to craft a subjective model for s. 2(d) protection.  As was evident, this model 
finds little support in the current jurisprudence.  Since its breadth could be un-
workable, this raises additional questions.  What does this say about the nature of 
freedom of association as compared to religious or expressive freedoms?  Do courts 
take those freedoms more seriously?  Or, perhaps more accurately, is freedom of 
association somehow less personal or personally definable than freedom of religion 
and expression?   
By way of contrast, the objective model, which was extrapolated from the core pur-
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pose of s. 2(d) as defined by the Supreme Court of Canada, has much more support 
from the jurisprudence.  Its focus on protecting those activities reasonably neces-
sary for the establishment or maintenance of minimal togetherness is principled 
and workable.  However, insofar as it rejects any notion of a personal or subjective 
understanding of what constitutes association, it is probably too narrow.  Finally, in 
my opinion, the model and the case law are simply too restrictive in their resistance 
to protecting particular manifestations of association.    
It seems only inevitable that, at some point, an appellate court in this country will 
be confronted with a s. 2(d) claim which, in a novel fashion, asserts an individu-
ally or subjectively defined scope of protected association.  The law, as it currently 
stands, is too modest in its protection of individual associational activity.  Hope-
fully, a balance can be struck between the unworkable breadth of the subjective 
model and the harsh and stubborn restrictiveness of the current law.  A qualified 
form of content neutrality could provide the right balance.     
 
